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1 Introduction
Economists have debated the efficacy of industrial policy to develop backward regions for a
long time, with some viewing these policies as inefficient and a waste of taxpayers’ money
and others arguing for its effectiveness in solving market failures. In practice, however, state
and local governments throughout the world have used “place-based” policies by offering tax
incentives, subsidies, land grants, infrastructure and other benefits to firms in an effort to
industrialize and generate employment and productivity at the local level.
Glaeser (2001) discusses the logic behind location-based tax incentives. These incentives
attract firms that hire local labor and produce output, thereby generating both producer
and consumer surplus. Entry of new firms are also beneficial to the existing local economy if
they generate positive spillovers and agglomeration economies. Both these channels increase
welfare at the local level. Local governments also use these tax incentives to maximize tax
revenues in the long run, by giving tax breaks to firms up-front and impose taxes later on.
Sometimes different firms are given differential tax benefits depending on their preference
for the location (with firms with higher preference for the location receiving lesser benefits).
Moretti (2011) uses spatial equilibrium analysis to explain the incidence and welfare impli-
cations of centrally financed subsidies to help disadvantaged areas. Whether such policies
benefit the disadvantaged area depends on the elasticity of labor supply and housing supply.
Rigorous econometric studies of the causal effects of industrial policies have been difficult
in the past because of the absence of clear identification strategies and data limitations. With
the availability of more microdata, there has been a spate of recent papers looking at location
based policies. However, the debate on the usefulness of such policies is still ongoing.
Most of the prior literature on place-based policies has focused on Empowerment Zones
(EZ) in the US; neighborhoods receiving tax breaks and job subsidies. Neumark and Kolko
(2010) use geocoded data on establishments to conclude that EZs in California have not led
to employment growth and hence have been ineffective. However, Busso and Kline (2012) use
confidential microdata and use rejected and future applicants to the EZ program as controls
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to find that the program increased employment and wages inside the zones at moderate
efficiency costs. Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012) use an instrumental
variable technique to find employment effects of the ‘Regional Selective Assistance’, in the
UK. Most of the other recent literature on place based policies looks at the US or Europe.
For example, Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012) look at the impact of French Enterprise
Zones (ZFUs) on the location decisions of firms and find a positive impact albeit with
displacement effects from the untreated areas to the treated areas. There is also some
related literature looking at the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in China (Wang
(2010)) and industrial clusters in India (Fernandes and Sharma (2012)).
This paper looks at a similar policy in a developing country context in India. Specifically, I
look at the central government sponsored New Industrial Policy for the states of Uttarakhand
and Himachal Pradesh. As part of the policy change, post-2003, all new industrial units or
existing units on their substantial expansion, set up in industrial estates within the state,
received fiscal benefits such as 100% excise duty exemption for 10 years and 100% income
tax exemption for 5 years, from the date of commercial production. Other benefits included
a capital investment subsidy on plant and machinery subject to an upper limit of Rs. 30
lakhs (approximately USD 60,000).
I look at this policy change using a differences-in-differences methodology and find a 37%
increase in employment, 27% increase in the number of factories, 57% increase in total output
and a 87% increase in fixed capital at the 3-digit industry level, as a result of the policy
change. I also find a 10.3% increase in the number of workers employed, 11.4% increase
in total output and a 7% increase in fixed capital (including depreciation) in incumbent
firms. Existing firms also increase their additions to fixed capital (before depreciation) and
additions to plant and machinery by 27.5% and 25.6% respectively. Further, I can also rule
out relocation of firms from control states to treated states. There is also some evidence
of heterogeneity in these effects based on firm size, and I find most of the employment and
output effects concentrated in small firms (based on different cutoffs) and almost no effect on
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larger firms. Finally, I use synthetic control methods (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller
(2010)) as a robustness check for the treatment effects of the policy change.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to rigorously evaluate the impact of a central
government sponsored policy to industrialize a backward area in a developing country, by
providing tax incentives for new and existing firms. Since this policy change leads to growth
in both the intensive and extensive margins without any evidence of relocation of firms from
untreated to treated areas, this study informs policy makers about the efficacy of tax benefits
to industrialize backward regions. In this regard, the results of this paper suggest a larger
role for “industrial policy” to correct for market failures and regional economic disparities
especially in developing countries.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the background for the
study and the details of the policy. Then, Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, Section
4 describes the data and the results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the
robustness of these results and finally Section 7, provides some conclusions.
2 Background and Policy Details
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand are two states in the north of India (see Figure 1). In
November 2000, the Himalayan and adjoining northwestern districts of Uttar Pradesh were
consolidated to form the state of Uttarakhand. After the formation of Uttarakhand, it was
placed in the list of “special category” states 1 that included Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal
Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and
Tripura.
Both Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are two of the smaller states in India, together
covering roughly 18.6% of India’s total area. They are predominantly covered by hilly areas
1These areas have hilly and difficult terrain, very low level of infrastructural development and significant
tribal population. Almost all of them are border states with considerable international borders. These states
get preferential treatment in federal assistance.
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and forests2. Industrialization was considered a policy challenge in the two states, owing to
the topography.
Beginning 2003, the Government of India (central government), to attract investments in
the industrial sector and generate employment in the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal
Pradesh decided to provide the following incentive package.
I. New industrial units and existing industrial units on their substantial expansion (in-
crease by not less than 25% in the value of fixed capital investment in plant and machinery of
an industrial unit for the purpose of expansion of capacity/modernization and diversification)
set up in ‘designated’ industrial estates/growth centers would be entitled to :
(a) 100% excise duty exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement
of commercial production
(b) 100% income tax exemption for an initial period of five years and thereafter 30% for
companies and 25% for others for a further period of five years
(c) all new industries and existing units (upon substantial expansion) in the notified
locations would be eligible for capital investment subsidy equaling 15% of their investment
in plant and machinery, subject to a ceiling of Rs.30 lakh (approximately USD 60,000).
II. A list of ‘thrust sector’ industries was compiled that would be eligible for the benefits
listed above irrespective of whether they located in an industrial estate or not.
The thrust sector included floriculture, medicinal herbs and aromatic herbs processing,
honey, horticulture and agro based industries (such as sauces, ketchup, etc., fruit juices,
fruit pulp, preserved fruits and vegetables, jams, jellies, vegetable juices, puree, pickles etc.,
processing of fresh fruits and vegetables including packaging), food processing industry3,
sugar and its by-products, silk and silk products, wool and wool products, woven fabrics
(excisable garments), sports goods, paper and paper products, pharmaceutical products,
information and communication technology industry and computer hardware call centers,
2According to India State of Forest Report, 2011, forest area covered 66.5% of the area of Himachal
Pradesh and 64.8% of the area in Uttarakhand
3See Appendix for Negative list - a list of industries that did not receive these benefits
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bottling of mineral water, eco-tourism (hotels, resorts, spa, entertainment/amusement parks
and ropeways), industrial gases, handicrafts and non-timber forest based industries.
Importantly, a few months after the policy (in June 2003) was initiated, the Government
of India issued a notification4 designating the areas in the two states where industrial units
would be eligible to get these tax incentives. The notification included (i) Existing Industrial
Estates (ii) Proposed Industrial Estates (iii) Industrial Activity in Non-industrial Area and
(iv) Expansion of existing industrial estates. This notification made almost all of the existing
industrial activity prior to 2003 and surrounding areas eligible for the benefits along with
adding new industrial estates. This practically blurred the differential treatment accorded
to the thrust sector industries, because there was no area (where industrial activity was
possible) in the two states where the policy would not be applicable.
The central excise tax exemption was removed on 31st March 2010, and the income tax
exemption was removed on the 31st of March 2012. Essentially, any new industrial units
set up or existing units upon substantial expansion in these states prior to the above dates
would continue to be eligible for these benefits as per the above rules.
3 Empirical Strategy
In this paper I intend to empirically test whether the centrally sponsored location specific tax
incentives led to an increase in employment, output, fixed capital and the number of factories
in the treated states. The empirical strategy uses the 2003 policy change that provided
tax incentives to the two states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh in a difference-in-
differences setup. I use this state-year variation to compare outcomes before and after the
policy change (2003) in the treated states to a set of control units - either neighboring states,
all major states or bordering districts. Since this is a centrally sponsored scheme, this paper
is not concerned with different states competing against each other by providing differential
4See Notification No. 50/2003 - Central Excise, Dated: June 10, 2003, available at
http://himachal.nic.in/industry/welcomelat.htm
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benefits to attract firms.
Indian firm level data sets do not provide exact location identifiers (to the level of street
address and zip codes) below the district level. Since each district in the two treated states
had at least one designated area that was affected by the policy change, an empirical strategy
comparing firms/industries across districts within the treated states would not be possible.5
Following visits to the respective state industry departments it became clear that the notifi-
cation brought almost all existing industrial activity within the ambit of the policy change
and also added new areas. Therefore, unlike Mayer, Mayneris, and Py (2012), the closing
down of existing firms in ineligible areas to re-open in an eligible industrial area within the
state is not a concern here.
It is thus reasonable to consider this policy as affecting the entire states of Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Hence, I believe that this is the best empirical strategy to answer
this question in the given context. However, in this paper, it will not be possible to separate
out the effects of the tax incentives from the capital subsidy provided.
Before looking at regression specifications, Figures 2 and 3 plot the raw data over time
for the variables of interest at the state-industry level. These plots show that the pre-2003
the trends in employment, number of factories, total output and fixed capital were similar
across the treated and control states, only diverging post treatment. The pre-treatment
trends look parallel and provide visual support to the use of difference-in-differences strategy
in this context to estimate the causal effect of the policy change.
More specifically, I run two main types of regressions (DID specifications) to estimate
the causal effect of the policy change. First, I run state-3-digit industry level regressions of
the form:
ysjt = δs + λjt + β(postt ∗ treats) + γ(Xst) + sjt (1)
5we use the terms industrial estate and designated area interchangeably because many non-industrial
areas with existing industrial activity prior to 2003 were included as eligible areas for the policy through
Notification 50/2003
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where s,j,t indexes state, 3-digit industry and time respectively, ysjt represents an out-
come variable such as employment, number of factories, total output or fixed capital that
varies at the state, industry and year level, δs represents state fixed effects, λjt represents
industry-year fixed effects and Xst represents time varying controls. The coefficient β, on
the interaction term postt ∗ treats where
postt =
 1 if year is 2003 or after0 if year is pre 2003
treats =
 1 if state is Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh0 otherwise (control states)
is then the causal effect of the policy change. I include pre-treatment state level variables
from the 2001 Census such as population, number of workers, number of illiterates in the
state, that I interact with a time dummy for each year as control variables. These regressions
are similar to the area level employment and number of plants regressions in Criscuolo,
Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012). The regressions with employment, output and
fixed capital therefore look at both the extensive (entry and exit of firms) and intensive
margin (growth by existing firms) of the policy change. The regression with number of
factories as the regressand gives us the extensive margin directly as it is an aggregate that
takes in to account both entry and exit of firms.
The next set of regressions are at the firm level :
yisjt = αi + δs + λjt + β(postt ∗ treats) + γ(Xisjt) + isjt (2)
where i,s,j,t indexes firm, state, 4-digit industry and time respectively and yisjt represents
an outcome variable such as employment, output, fixed capital, additions to fixed capital
and additions to plant and machinery at the firm level. I also use age and age-squared as
controls in the regressions. Since the policy (post) dummy equals one for all years post 2003
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and zero otherwise, the inclusion of firm fixed effects removes the effect of entrants post 2003.
Hence, this regression looks at the impact of the policy change on the outcome measures of
incumbent firms. Hence, this regression can be interpreted as the “intensive margin” of the
policy change.
Displacement of firms from the control states to the treated states might lead us to
wrongfully attribute the observed effects as being caused by the policy change. To check
whether firms close down in bordering states to reopen in the treated state, I take two
approaches. First, I look at trends in the number of operational factories in the treated
states and the neighboring control states (Figure 5). Then, I run a regression with the
number of closed firms6 at the state-industry level as the dependent variable to look at the
differential impact on firm closing across the treated and control states, before and after the
policy change. Another related concern might be that the policy induces spillovers in the
neighboring states. Since the magnitude of the treatment effects are similar whether we look
at only neighboring states or all major states together as the control group, it is reasonable
to conclude that the results are not being driven by spillovers. Such externalities might be
substantial especially for the bordering districts regressions. To check whether the results
are being driven by spillovers, I first run a regression specification with the firms along the
border in the treated states compared with firms further away from the bordering districts in
the control states (Appendix Table 9). I also perform robustness checks using the synthetic
control method where the synthetic control group is formed using a weighted average of all
the states to best match the treated states. For all outcome variables (shown below), the
synthetic control group is composed of states that are not neighboring the treated states. All
these results from various specifications suggest that the results in the paper are not driven
by spillovers.




I use two data sets: (i) Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) state-3-digit industry panel (from
1999-2000 to 2007-08) and (ii) ASI firm level panel (1998-99 to 2007-08) to look at the effect
of the policy change.
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and
Program Implementation (MoSPI), is the main source of industrial statistics in India. The
ASI covers the entire Factory Sector comprising industrial units (called factories) registered
under the Sections 2(m)(i) and 2(m)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948. This includes all firms
employing 10 or more workers with the aid of power and 20 or more workers without the aid
of power. ASI also covers bidi and cigar units, registered under the Bidi and Cigar Workers
(Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. Geographically, it covers the entire country except
the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim and Union Territory of Lakshadweep
for the surveys.
The ASI frame is divided into census (surveyed every year) and sample (sampled every
few years) sectors. However, the definition of the two sectors have changed from time to time.
Five industrially backward states (Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura and Andaman
and Nicobar Islands) are always covered in the census sector. For the rest of India, the
definition of the census sector has changed from 200 or more employees (1998-2000) to 100
or more employees (2001 onwards). To take in to account the changes in the sampling frame,
I run weighted regressions at the firm level with the sampling weights provided by ASI.
I restrict the sample to the major states and union territories of India as covered by the
ASI, and do not include Jammu & Kashmir or the states in the north-east namely Assam,
Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura.
For the state-industry level regressions I use the ASI state-3-digit industry panel. Each
observation is at the state-industry-year level. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for
the variables of interest at the state-3 digit industry level. As Table 1 shows, the two treated
states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand start out with smaller industrial employment,
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number of factories, total output and fixed capital as compared to neighboring states or the
rest of India before 2003. For example, average employment size in a 3 digit industry before
2003 in the treated states was 590 as compared to the figures for neighboring states (3154)
or all the major states together (4952). Post-2003, the average size of industrial employment
goes up throughout India, but the increase is highest in the treated states. Similar increases
can be seen for number of factories, total output and fixed capital after 2003 in the treated
states as compared to other states. Mean total output and fixed capital at the state industry
level rises almost three-folds in the treated states after 2003, much larger than the increase
in the other states.
For the firm level regressions I use the ASI firm level panel.“Firm” in this context means
a factory, the unit of observation in the data set. Table 2 shows summary statistics for
the different outcome variables at the firm level broken up by treated states, neighboring
states and major states for periods before and after the policy change. I use the sampling
weights from the data set to construct the summary statistics for the estimated population7.
Average employment within the firm increases post 2003, irrespective of which group we look
at. Median employment after 2003 however, increases by almost 56% for firms in the treated
state whereas the increase is negligible for firms in the rest of the country. Mean output and
fixed capital almost double for firms in the treated group after 2003. This increase is much
larger compared to any other group.
5 Results
I begin by looking at the results for the difference-in-differences regressions at the state
industry level for different outcome variables (Tables 3 to 6) and then look at employment
at the firm level (Table 7) and finally discuss the firm size heterogeneity results (Table 8a
and 8b).
7See Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2011) and Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2011)
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5.1 State-industry results
Having shown the trends in the outcome variables with the raw data in Figures 2 and 3, I now
report the regression results. Table 3 reports employment regressions at the state-industry
level. Panel A uses neighboring states as the control group and includes Haryana, Punjab,
Delhi, Chandigarh and Uttar Pradesh. The states of Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh
border the treated states, whereas Chandigarh and Delhi are the commercial hubs near the
treated states. In Panel B, all the major states of India are included as the control group.
This includes the neighboring states and the states of Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu,
Jharkhand, Gujarat and West Bengal.
Column 1 includes state, year and 3-digit industry fixed effects. The state fixed effects
control for time invariant state characteristics like the area and topography of the state, the
year fixed effects control for any macroeconomic shocks affecting all states and the industry
fixed effects control for time invariant industry characteristics. Column 2 is a more flexible
specification as it includes industry-year fixed effects which control for time varying industry
characteristics. This is important because some industries like pharmaceuticals and IT have
grown in India over the last decade, and the industry-year fixed effects controls for these
changes. Column 3 includes time varying controls at the state level to the specification in
Column 1. I include pre-2003 state level variables from the 2001 census such as population,
number of workers and number of illiterates and interact them with a time dummy for each
year as control variables. Column 4 includes the specification of Column 2 with time varying
controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. For each regression, I also
report Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) multi-way clustered standard errors at the state
and year level.
The dependent variable in Table 3 is the log of employment at the 3-digit industry level.
In columns 1 to 4, the coefficient of interest on the interaction post*treat is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Mean employment at the industry level increases by around 37
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- 42% in Panel A. In Panel B, I run the same specifications with all major states as the
comparison group. The coefficient of interest in Panel B is between 43% and 45%.
Table 4 looks at the same specifications for log of total number of factories as the depen-
dent variable. In this table, the coefficient on post*treat can be interpreted as the “extensive
margin” of the policy change as it takes in to account new entry by firms as a result of the
policy change. Columns 1 through 4, Panel A, show that the effect of the policy change on
the average number of factories in an industry is between 27% and 29%. The corresponding
estimates from Panel B show a 31% increase in the average number of factories. Table 4
confirms that the policy change led to a large increase in the number of new firms coming
in to the treated states.
Table 5 shows the results for log of total output at the state-industry level. The effect of
the policy change on total output is even larger than the effect on total employment ranging
between 58% and 64%. Results for log of fixed capital are shown in Table 6. The results show
an increase of 87% for fixed capital and part of this can be attributed to the “substantial
expansion” clause (although I cannot explicitly test this) where existing firms would need to
increase their investment of fixed capital by at least 25% to avail the tax incentives. Further,
capital investment subsidies were also provided in these two states post 2003 to both new
and existing firms, leading to this massive increase in fixed capital at the industry level.
Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients over time along with standard errors at the 95%
confidence interval level. These coefficients are obtained from a regression of the outcome
variable (log employment, log factories, log output and log fixed capital) on the interaction
between treat (dummy variable for treated states) and time dummies after controlling for
state, year and industry fixed effects. These graphs visually show that before 2003, there
were no trends in the outcomes and the effects only show up after 2003. These graphs also
provide visual evidence for the treatment effect of the policy change.
There can be some concern that firms are closing down in the neighboring states to
reopen in the treated states to take advantage of the tax incentives. First, I plot the number
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of operational factories in the treated states and the neighboring control states. If the
policy change in 2003 caused factories to close down in the neighboring states and reopen
in the treated states, there should be a drop in the number of operational factories in the
neighboring states. Figure 5 plots the trends in operational factories and there is no evidence
that factories in the neighboring states closed down to relocate in the treated states. I also
run a regression specification similar to column 4 in the tables with state and industry-year
fixed effects and time varying controls with log of number of closed firms as the dependent
variable. The coefficient on post*treat is -0.0139 with a standard error of 0.245. Hence I
see no differential impact of the policy change on number of closed firms across neighboring
states. This suggests that there is no evidence for relocation of firms from neighboring states
in to treated states.
5.2 Firm level results
Firm level regressions are reported in Table 7. I restrict the sample to only open firms.
All columns, 1 through 4, include firm, year and 4-digit industry fixed effects. Columns
2 and 4 also control for 4 digit-industry-year fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for
any time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level and 4-digit industry-year fixed
effects take into account time varying effects across industries. I also control for age and
age-squared in all regressions. Columns 1 and 2 use firms in the neighboring states as the
control group. In columns 3 and 4, I restrict the sample to bordering districts, with the idea
being that the districts on the side of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh receive the tax
incentives as compared to the districts on the other side of the border in the neighboring
states, which then act as a suitable control group. I essentially compare outcomes for firms
across bordering districts before and after the policy change. These regressions provide a
strict test on the identification strategy and provide credible support to my results from
using firms in neighboring states as the control group.
In Table 7, the coefficients on the interaction term post*treat can be interpreted as the
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“intensive margin” of the policy change as it shows the effect of the policy change on in-
cumbent firms (firms present both before and after the policy change). This is because all
the specifications control for firm fixed effects, and this removes the effect of new entrants.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the mean employment at the firm level increases by 7-10%. The
results in columns 3 and 4 with firms in bordering districts as the control group also shows
an increase in mean employment by around 11%. Output at the firm level increases by
11.4% (Column 2). The magnitude of the effect on output is larger (23.7%) in the bordering
districts regression but are roughly in the same range.
I also run regressions with fixed capital, additions to fixed capital and additions to plant
and machinery as the outcome variables. Fixed capital includes depreciation and additions
to fixed capital, plant and machinery are measures of actual additions before depreciation.
Fixed capital shows an increase of around 7-8%. Actual additions to fixed capital increases by
around 28% and additions to plant and machinery increases by around 26%. The results from
the bordering districts regressions are very similar to these magnitudes. These results provide
suggestive evidence that existing firms took advantage of the “substantial expansion” clause
and increased investment on fixed capital by more than 25% to take get the tax benefits.
In this respect, these results confirm that the policy was successful in incentivizing firms to
invest more in plant and machinery.
Restricting the sample to districts along the border of treated and control states may
bias the results because of spillovers. To check for this I run a regression specification with
the firms along the border in the treated states compared with firms further away from the
bordering districts in the control states. These results are shown in Table 9 in the Appendix.
For existing firms in the treated districts as compared to control districts, employment went
up by 15% and output by 16% after 2003. This lends support for the bordering districts
regression specification in Table 7.
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5.3 Firm size heterogeneity
Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and van Reenen (2012), find that the effect of the “Regional
Selective Assistance” in the UK on employment is confined to smaller firms with almost
no effect on larger firms. To check for such treatment effect heterogeneity by size, I run
regressions to look at the treatment effects of the policy on firms with different cutoffs in
Tables 8a and 8b.
Table 8a looks at 3 size cutoffs - below 50 workers, between 50 and 100 workers and above
100 workers. Table 8b reports a different set of cutoffs - below 40 workers, between 40 and
80 workers and more than 80 workers. An interesting pattern emerges from the table. Mean
employment and output in Table 8a goes up for smaller firms (less than 50 workers) by 9%
and 10% respectively, with negligible effect for the large firms (more than 100 workers). This
is the case even in Table 8b where employment and output increase by 8.6% and 11.3% for
firms with less than 40 workers. There is no effect (negative and insignificant effect) for firms
with more than 80 workers. These results are also broadly similar to Bronzini and Iachini
(2011) and Lach (2002), who find that R & D incentives have an effect on smaller firms but
not on larger firms in Italy and Israel respectively. However, when we look at additions to
fixed capital or additions to plant and machinery, large firms show a large and significant
increase whereas smaller firms show a statistically insignificant increase.
Most employment and output growth is concentrated with the smaller firms. A plausible
rationale for this heterogeneous effect might be that the smaller firms are credit constrained
and the tax benefits relax the constraint, thereby allowing them to expand output and hire
more labor. These results also conform with Banerjee and Duflo (2012), where they look at
a directed lending program in India and find that many firms were credit constrained and
actually used the credit to expand production rather than as a substitute for other forms of
credit.
There is also some suggestive evidence that large firms increase their investments in plant
and machinery to take advantage of the tax incentives (substantial expansion clause) but
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do not increase output or employment. For example in Table 8a, firms with more than
100 workers increase their additions to plant and machinery and fixed capital by 39.8% and
32.4% respectively but show negligible effect for output and employment. The same pattern
holds true in Table 8b for firms with over 80 workers. However, the results are not strong
enough to conclude that larger firms are gaming the system.
6 Robustness
The New Industrial Policy for the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, provides an
ideal setup to apply the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003); Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)). I use the method to find a “synthetic control” group for
the treated states, by using a weighted average of the available “donor pool” (units that are
unaffected by the policy), so that it best matches the value of the predictors of the outcomes
of interest (directly employed, number of factories, total output and fixed capital) before
2003. This synthetic control group then approximates the trajectory of the outcomes for
the treated units in the counterfactual event that the policy had not been in place. Since
the choice of the control units is data driven, the method is extremely transparent. I, then
perform “placebo tests” where the synthetic control method is applied to all the control
units in the sample, with the treated unit in the donor pool. The inference is then exact, in
the sense that I look at the ratio of the post-intervention (2003) to pre-intervention mean
squared prediction error (MSPE) from the treated units’ outcome and compare it to the
same ratio for all the placebos. This is similar to permutation tests, and essentially tests
whether the effect of the treatment is much larger in the treated states as compared to a
randomly chosen placebo. If the effect is of a similar magnitude between the treated and a
randomly chosen placebo, then it is not possible to conclude with any confidence that the
treatment effect is real.
First, I aggregate the data from the two treated states into one treated unit, as the
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synthetic method works when there is one treated unit and a bunch of control units to
choose from. In this analysis, I use the ASI state-industry level panel data and use the total
aggregated numbers over all industries in the state in a year. Since I do not include Jammu
& Kashmir or the states in the north-east of India in the ‘donor pool’, there are 23 available
control states and union territories to choose from.
The outcome variable of interest is directly employed, number of factories , total output
and fixed capital, for all industries together in a state in a given year. As predictors of
the outcome variables at the state level, I include number of males, females, literacy rate,
number of workers, number of main and marginal workers,cultivators, agricultural laborers
and percentage of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. These variables are available
from the 2001 census. I also include the lagged values of the outcome variables in the
pre-intervention period (2000-03).
Figure 6, Panel A graphically shows the treatment effect of the 2003 policy change on
number employed in all industries in the states. The solid line shows the trajectory for
the treated states, which is closely matched by the dashed line (synthetic control) in the
pre-intervention phase, only to diverge substantially post 2003. Appendix Table 10a shows
the weights on the states in the donor pool, to provide a good synthetic control. Only
Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Jharkhand and Rajasthan have positive
weights, with the rest of the states with zero weights. Both Chandigarh and Dadra and Nagar
Haveli are union territories and the results are unchanged on removing the union territories
from the donor pool. Using logs of the outcome variables also keeps the results unchanged.
Appendix Table 10b shows the values for various predictors of the outcome variable for
both the treated and the synthetic control groups. Figure 6, Panel B is used to conduct
the inference test. It shows the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention MSPE for the
treated states and all the placebo runs for states in the donor pool. Evidently, the ratio is
the largest for the treated states. Hence, if the treatment was randomly assigned to any
unit in the sample, the probability of obtaining a ratio as large as that of the treated states
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would be 1/24 = 0.042. Hence, it is significant at the 5% level.
Figure 7, Panel A shows the synthetic control method graph for the outcome variable -
number of factories in all industries at the state level. Appendix Table 11a shows that posi-
tive weights have been applied to Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand and Rajasthan. Results remain unchanged on removing the union territories
(Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Chandigarh). Appendix Table 11b shows the mean of the
predictors used for number of factories. I conduct a similar inference test in Figure 7, Panel
B and plot the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention MSPE. The ratio is largest for
the treated state and hence the probability of obtaining a ratio as large as is 1/24 = 0.042.
Figure 8 and 9 show the synthetic control method graphs for total output and fixed
capital. For both these outcome variables the post/pre 2003 MSPE is the largest for the
treated states and hence the p-value is 1/24 = 0.042. Hence, the treatment effect is significant
at the 5% level for all outcomes of interest.
7 Conclusion
Many argue that industrial policy is a waste of taxpayers’ money and governments use it to
prevent competition and pick winners. Others argue that industrial policy might be needed
to fix market failures such as spillovers. Whether location based tax incentives work and
help in industrialization and employment generation at the local level, thus is largely an
empirical question. Previously there was a paucity of rigorous studies to look at the causal
effects of such policies because of clear identification strategies and data issues. In the last few
years, there has been a growing empirical literature on place based policies, mainly as more
micro-data has become available. However, these policies have largely been understudied
in developing countries where regional economic disparities can be large and labor mobility
might be low.
In this paper, I look at such a policy in India - the New Industrial Policy for the states
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of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, that provided income tax and excise tax exemption
to new industrial units and existing industrial units on their expansion, starting 2003. I use
state-industry data and this state-year variation to find that employment, number of firms,
total output and fixed capital increase at the 3-digit industry level. I find no evidence of
relocation of firms from neighboring states in to the treated states. I also use firm level
data, to find that the average employment, output, fixed capital, and additions to plant and
machinery increased for existing firms as a result of this policy. Hence, I am able to show that
the policy change affected both the intensive (growth by existing firms) and extensive (entry
of new firms) margins. I also look at heterogeneity by firm size and find that the policy led to
employment and output increases for smaller firms and had almost no impact on larger firms
despite increases in their fixed capital investments. These results are consistent with smaller
firms being credit constrained and the tax benefits easing these constraints and suggestive
of large firms gaming the system.
However, these results are at best medium-term effects of the policy change on various
economic outcomes. It will be interesting to look at the long run impacts of this policy after
the removal of the incentives (See Kline and Moretti (2011)). Whether or not such policies
have a lasting impact (for example, agglomeration economies)8 or only attract fly-by-night
operators that shut shop and relocate to the next area with such benefits is an important
issue but beyond the scope of this paper. With more data available in the following years,
this will be an exciting avenue for future research.
8See Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)
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Table 1: Summary statistics at the state-3 digit industry level
Variable State Time period Observations Mean Median
Number employed All states Pre-2003 3604 3962.88 801
Post-2003 6179 4162.30 822
Treated Pre-2003 231 589.68 274
Post-2003 424 834.16 377
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 3153.96 1057
Post-2003 1203 3554.21 1046
All major states Pre-2003 2746 4952.17 1294
Post-2003 4630 5237.32 1258
Number of factories All states Pre-2003 3604 107.64 26
Post-2003 6179 112.77 26
Treated Pre-2003 231 15.98 9
Post-2003 424 21.15 12
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 103.90 41
Post-2003 1203 110.14 41
All major states Pre-2003 2746 134.31 40
Post-2003 4630 141.98 40
Total output All states Pre-2003 3604 8379.36 1420.45
(in ‘000,000 Rs.) Post-2003 6179 16268.90 2471.30
Treated Pre-2003 231 1506.81 486.70
Post-2003 424 4197.37 1392.50
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 7322.53 2238.90
Post-2003 1203 13135.86 3370.40
All major states Pre-2003 2746 10381.42 2340.95
Post-2003 4630 20213.52 3634.80
Fixed capital All states Pre-2003 3604 3541.41 394.80
(in ‘000,000 Rs.) Post-2003 6179 5103.75 538.60
Treated Pre-2003 231 735.84 108.60
Post-2003 424 1886.03 295.40
Neighboring states Pre-2003 709 2423.11 536.60
Post-2003 1203 3268.24 605.40
All major states Pre-2003 2746 4430.63 648.90
Post-2003 4630 6398.87 869.75
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar
Pradesh; All major states: Neighboring states plus Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, West Bengal. Observations here are state-3
digit-year observations.
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Table 2: Summary statistics at the firm level
Variable State Time period Observations Mean Median
Number employed All states Pre-2003 93276 41.50 11
Post-2003 195581 42.64 12
Treated Pre-2003 1915 39.63 9
Post-2003 5222 43.43 14
Neighboring states Pre-2003 18192 32.74 10
Post-2003 39710 36.03 11
All major states Pre-2003 84879 41.55 11
Post-2003 176605 42.62 12
Total output All states Pre-2003 88126 92.80 9.16
(in ‘000,000 Rs.) Post-2003 187796 173.00 13.50
Treated Pre-2003 1743 110.00 14.40
Post-2003 4733 230.00 42.60
Neighboring states Pre-2003 17234 80.00 10.40
Post-2003 38348 136.00 14.40
All major states Pre-2003 80680 91.90 8.89
Post-2003 170818 170.00 12.80
Fixed capital All states Pre-2003 96718 35.80 1.37
(in ‘000,000 Rs.) Post-2003 206686 49.50 2.03
Treated Pre-2003 1961 47.10 1.73
Post-2003 5461 92.80 5.99
Neighboring states Pre-2003 18741 24.10 1.47
Post-2003 42523 30.90 1.94
All major states Pre-2003 87607 35.90 1.33
Post-2003 185860 49.40 1.95
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar
Pradesh; All major states: Neighboring states plus Rajasthan, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, West Bengal. Observations here are firm-year
observations.
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Table 3: Dependent variable: Log employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.418*** 0.372***
(0.0740) (0.0827) (0.0884) (0.0999)
[0.129] [0.143] [0.141] [0.154]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.688 0.709 0.691 0.712
Panel B
post*treat 0.427*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.448***
(0.0877) (0.0899) (0.0788) (0.0822)
[0.124] [0.138] [0.131] [0.141]
Observations 8,028 8,028 8,028 8,028
R-squared 0.625 0.634 0.626 0.634
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes X Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is log employment in the 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state level variables interacted with a
time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Dependent variable: Log of total factories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.268*** 0.267*** 0.291*** 0.270***
(0.0569) (0.0616) (0.0792) (0.0815)
[0.107] [0.107] [0.140] [0.133]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.725 0.736 0.727 0.738
Panel B
post*treat 0.310*** 0.311*** 0.315*** 0.315***
(0.0680) (0.0693) (0.0596) (0.0610)
[0.0943] [0.105] [0.0955] [0.104]
Observations 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.715 0.719 0.716 0.719
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of total number of factories in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on
the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state level variables
interacted with a time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group
whereas Panel B uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level.
Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at
1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Dependent variable: Log of total output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.579*** 0.584*** 0.619*** 0.566***
(0.0969) (0.108) (0.116) (0.132)
[0.158] [0.180] [0.199] [0.199]
Observations 2567 2567 2567 2567
R-squared 0.655 0.679 0.658 0.682
Panel B
post*treat 0.561*** 0.577*** 0.623*** 0.639***
(0.106) (0.107) (0.101) (0.104)
[0.146] [0.159] [0.160] [0.173]
Observations 8,031 8,031 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.611 0.622 0.611 0.622
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of total output in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state level variables interacted with a
time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 6: Dependent variable: Log of fixed capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
post*treat 0.718*** 0.714*** 0.878*** 0.866***
(0.132) (0.147) (0.209) (0.225)
[0.236] [0.264] [0.322] [0.347]
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
R-squared 0.668 0.691 0.672 0.695
Panel B
post*treat 0.711*** 0.728*** 0.776*** 0.787***
(0.158) (0.160) (0.145) (0.149)
[0.230] [0.243] [0.244] [0.258]
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030
R-squared 0.627 0.635 0.628 0.636
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes
time varying controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of fixed capital in a 3 digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on the interaction
term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state level variables interacted with a
time dummy for each year. Panel A shows the regressions with the neighboring states as the control group whereas Panel B
uses all major states as the control group. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state-year level. Standard errors
in square brackets are clustered at the state and year level using CGM multi-way clustering. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant
at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 7: Firm level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (employed)
post*treat 0.0747* 0.103** 0.0740 0.110*
(0.0386) (0.0400) (0.0577) (0.0544)
Observations 63,629 63,629 13,185 13,185
R-squared 0.939 0.942 0.946 0.953
Log (total output)
post*treat 0.0866** 0.114*** 0.177** 0.237***
(0.0430) (0.0414) (0.0711) (0.0722)
Observations 60,664 60,664 12,315 12,315
R-squared 0.965 0.967 0.970 0.976
Log (fixed capital)
post*treat 0.0552 0.0709* 0.0804 0.0812
(0.0368) (0.0387) (0.0501) (0.0495)
Observations 67,033 67,033 14,125 14,125
R-squared 0.973 0.974 0.978 0.981
Log (addition to fixed capital)
post*treat 0.278** 0.275** 0.277 0.406**
(0.120) (0.108) (0.170) (0.154)
Observations 52,906 52,906 10,503 10,503
R-squared 0.856 0.864 0.875 0.899
Log (addition to plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.255** 0.256** 0.199* 0.246
(0.110) (0.101) (0.113) (0.216)
Observations 41,674 41,674 8,222 8,222
R-squared 0.858 0.869 0.883 0.914
Control group Neighboring states Neighboring states Border districts Border districts
firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
4 digit industry year FE No Yes No Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-
treatment state level variables interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors in columns 1 to 2 are clustered at
the state-year level and at the district level for columns 3 and 4. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 8a: Firm size heterogeneity
(<)50 workers 50-100 workers (>)100 workers
Log (directly employed)
post*treat 0.0902* 0.0422* -0.0126
(0.0505) (0.0246) (0.0280)
Observations 47,162 5,709 10,450
R-squared 0.907 0.828 0.899
Log (total output)
post*treat 0.102* -0.167 -0.00602
(0.0517) (0.162) (0.0487)
Observations 42,133 5,495 12,745
R-squared 0.962 0.969 0.985
Log (addition to fixed capital)
post*treat 0.203 0.362 0.324*
(0.168) (0.382) (0.163)
Observations 35,764 5,279 11,585
R-squared 0.837 0.888 0.903
Log (addition to plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.109 0.381 0.398**
(0.157) (0.372) (0.198)
Observations 26,441 4,774 10,209
R-squared 0.856 0.860 0.850
Control group Neighboring states Neighboring states Neighboring states
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes
4 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes
30
Table 8b: Firm size heterogeneity
(<)40 workers 40-80 workers (>)80 workers
Log (directly employed)
post*treat 0.0860* 0.0238 -0.0119
(0.0484) (0.0492) (0.0211)
Observations 44,666 6,352 12,168
R-squared 0.904 0.834 0.904
Log (total output)
post*treat 0.113** -0.0626 -0.0390
(0.0482) (0.124) (0.0370)
Observations 39,777 6,049 14,417
R-squared 0.962 0.974 0.984
Log (addition to fixed capital)
post*treat 0.169 0.734** 0.340**
(0.169) (0.347) (0.165)
Observations 33,476 5,843 13,185
R-squared 0.835 0.899 0.897
Log (addition to plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.128 0.650 0.405**
(0.170) (0.392) (0.193)
Observations 24,452 5,206 11,669
R-squared 0.859 0.872 0.842
Control group Neighboring states Neighboring states Neighboring states
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes
4 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes
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Figure 1: Map of India
SOURCE: mapsofindia.com
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Notes: These graphs plot the coefficients obtained from a regression of the outcome variable (mentioned on
top of the graph) on the interaction between the treated states dummy and year dummies. The regressions
control for state, year and 3-digit industry fixed effects. The Y-axis shows the estimated coefficients and the
X-axis shows the various years. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in employment between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in total factories between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in total output between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference. Total output is measured in ‘00,000 Rs.
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Notes: Panel A shows the gaps in fixed capital between the treated and the synthetic control unit while
Panel B shows a histogram for inference. Fixed capital is measured in ‘00,000 Rs.
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8 Appendix
Negative list for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh9
1. Tobacco and tobacco products including cigarettes and pan masala
2. Thermal Power Plant(coal/oil based)
3. Coal washeries/dry coal processing
4. Inorganic Chemicals excluding medicinal grade oxygen, medicinal grade hydrogen per-
oxide, compressed air
5. Organic chemicals excluding Provitamins/vitamins, Hormones, Glycosides, sugars
6. Tanning and dyeing extracts, tanins and their derivatives, dyes, colours, paints and
varnishes; putty, fillers and other mastics; inks
7. Marble and mineral substances not classified elsewhere
8. Flour mills/rice mill
9. Foundries using coal
10. Minerals fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; Bituminous substances:
mineral waxes
11. Synthetic rubber products
12. Cement clinkers and asbestos, raw including fibre
13. Explosive (including industrial explosives, detonators and fuses, fireworks, matches,
propellant powders etc.)
14. Mineral or chemical fertilizers
9Source: Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Govt. of India
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15. Insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and pesticides (basic manufacture and formulation)
16. Fibre glass & articles thereof
17. Manufacture of pulp - wood pulp, mechanical or chemical (including dissolving pulp)
18. Branded aerated water/soft drinks (non-fruit based)
19. Paper
19.1 Writing or printing paper, etc.
19.2 Paper or paperboard, etc.
19.3 Maplitho paper, etc.
19.4 Newsprint, in rolls or sheets
19.5 Craft paper, etc.
19.6 Sanitary towels, etc.
19.7 Cigarette paper
19.8 Grease-proof paper
19.9 Toilet or facial tissue, etc.
19.10 Paper & paper board, laminated internally with bitumen, tar or asphalt
19.11 Carbon or similar copying paper
19.12 Products consisting of sheets of paper or paperboard, impregnated, coated or covered
with plastics, etc.
19.13 Paper and paperboard, coated impregnated or covered with wax, etc.
20. Plastics and articles thereof
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Table 9: Firm level regression - testing for spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Log (employed) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital)
post*treat 0.151*** 0.162** 0.0388
(0.0535) (0.0698) (0.0628)
Observations 17,456 16,316 18,139
R-squared 0.958 0.975 0.978
firm FE YES YES YES
4 digit industry-year FE YES YES YES
Age Controls YES YES YES
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Control group includes districts that
are away from the borders in the neighboring states. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%,
**Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%.
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Table 10a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight





Dadra & NH 0.034





















Literacy rate 74.05 77.2577
Number of workers 3063249 3302985
Main workers 2143115 2463767
Marginal workers 920134 839217.7
Cultivators 1762493 1560680
Agricultural laborers 176927 532634
Household industrial workers 62483.5 85517.69
Percent SC 21.3 16.3341
Percent ST 3.5 6.394
Directly employed (2000-03) 22700 22756.61
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Table 11a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight
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Literacy rate 74.05 76.0972
Number of workers 3063249 3053144
Main workers 2143115 2185583
Marginal workers 920134 867560.7
Cultivators 1762493 1222037
Agricultural laborers 176927 778797.7
Household industrial workers 62483.5 87648.31
Percent SC 21.3 15.9141
Percent ST 3.5 7.5423
Number of factories(2000-03) 612.1667 613.6527
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Table 12a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight
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Literacy rate 74.05 77.0457
Number of workers 3063249 3012951
Main workers 2143115 2174101
Marginal workers 920134 838849.6
Cultivators 1762493 1265456
Agricultural laborers 176927 514184.3
Household industrial workers 62483.5 99604.07
Percent SC 21.3 16.9639
Percent ST 3.5 3.9131
Total output (2000-03) 580121 579834
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Table 13a: State weights in the synthetic ‘treated’ group
State Weight
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Literacy rate 74.05 76.8581
Number of workers 3063249 3226216
Main workers 2143115 2361348
Marginal workers 920134 864868.4
Cultivators 1762493 1514791
Agricultural laborers 176927 440779.2
Household industrial workers 62483.5 97437
Percent SC 21.3 16.3826
Percent ST 3.5 5.8507
Fixed capital (2000-03) 283296.8 284601.6
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